Guardian

SOMETHING significant happened in the country the other day, and almost went unnoticed. When President Goodluck Jonathan declared a state of emergency in three north eastern states, he said the nation was at war. Quite promptly, troops on air and land were deployed. It became the first time since the end of the civil war 43 years ago, that Nigerian planes would be dropping bombs on Nigerian territory.  The significance of this underlines the dire security straits the country is in.

Yet, the declaration of state of emergency and the prosecution of the war against Boko Haram insurgents have been far from brilliant. In the event, the administration has produced a string of curious parallels: the courageous was diluted with the expedient, the firm was juxtaposed with the tentative, and real action was mixed with mere expression of intent. The result is a fog where there ought to be clarity. Instead of the certainty of a solution, what the nation has now is a faint hope, maybe even nagging fear.

Late in coming, short on expectations, confusing in details and even doubtful in prospects, the state of emergency in Borno, Yobe and Adamawa states is at best, the first tentative steps towards addressing the insurgency. And bearing the imprimatur of the person and office of President Jonathan, it can only be hoped that this action would succeed. The government’s move is indeed an acknowledgment of the views repeatedly articulated by this newspaper in several editorials, on how to use secret dialogue, constructive engagement, regional cooperation and military action to tackle the spreading scourge of insecurity in the North East zone of the country. Had government adhered to suggestions contained in those comments earlier than now, things might have been different.

Although reports indicate that the troops surge is yielding results and the insurgents’ bases are coming under severe attack, a whole-hearted endorsement of the action is withheld on the ground that the measures announced by government seem half-hearted and not comprehensive enough.  Not only is there no known time-line for the emergency rule, the framework for success or failure has not been defined. For instance, at what point would the exercise be deemed a victory? When the death toll of innocent victims falls and by what margin? Or is it when actual fighting ends totally? Of course, undemocratic it may have seemed, a dismantling of the political and civil structures in the affected states for as long as the emergency rule lasts was something all who have witnessed the complete erosion of the civil authorities in those states expected. And while the Constitution does not specify this as a component of an emergency rule, the breakdown of law and order in the affected region has been such that a total overhaul and reassertion is needed. The present arrangement is a middle of the road course the President seemed to have taken under pressure from the National Assembly, which would not support a dissolution of the democratic structures. Rather, it allows simultaneous existence of two parallel authorities within the states, each structurally and contextually independent of the other. This undoubtedly is a potential source of conflict, which may aggravate the problem or at the minimum perpetuate the status quo.

The exercise of power within the military to which the states have been handed by virtue of the Emergency Declaration is through the Chief of Defence Staff. The civil authority in place in the affected states wields power through the executive and legislative arms completely insulated from military control or authority. The two arms are the organs through which constitutional powers are exercised and can take decisions for the state. As things are therefore, the question arises: Who takes decisions for the affected states? Is it the military authority or the governors and state legislatures? Where is the centre of authority in those states? Where there is a conflict of decision, who has the final say? It is not unlikely for the military authorities to deem a particular line of action operationally desirable while the civil authority may consider the same step as politically suicidal. Who yields ground in such a circumstance? Therein lies a veritable source of conflict that should worry all Nigerians. Even while the idea of suspending all democratic structures may appear draconian and may have elicited condemnation, as was the case when the Obasanjo Administration declared state of emergency in Plateau and Ekiti states, President Jonathan should have sketched out in his plan a clear line of authority and responsibility that all parties would not mistake for the status quo. This is why the declaration as proclaimed by the President appears too tentative.

Of course, it may be argued that the president as a democrat is expected to act as one at all times. This is understandable. But what happens when democracy is under threat? At the moment, is Nigeria’s democracy not being assailed and critically imperiled by the activities of the insurgents? The President himself said that Nigeria is at war. To salvage it from the clutches of the forces of disorder demands that extra-ordinary measures be taken to signal that Nigeria is neither divisible nor a ready picking for bigots and adventurers. This is the logical intendment of Section 305 of the Constitution, which provides for a state of emergency – which as it were is a negation of the lofty ideals of constitutional government. This provision implicitly acknowledges that the primary essence of government is the maintenance of law and order.

In essence, the President’s action seemed an expression of concern over the affected states as a Disaster Zone, warranting only a troops surge. Once again, while retaining the democratic offices and officers may be expedient, in that subsisting arrangement, it must be remembered that the governors and other political office holders may actually become part of the problem, hence their inability to solve it all along. Without a presidential delineation of the lines of authority in the emergency period, they may undermine the efforts of the military to restore peace to the area. Therefore, it is hoped that the current regime is an evolving process, which would be reviewed from time to time as new challenges emerge.

There is no time for prevarication and government has put itself in a position where it must now ensure the success of the action, or take the rap for failure.

Sufficient measures must be put in place to contain the insidious effects of military operation, including land and air bombardments of a part of Nigerian territory. There is no doubt that this action will produce angry backlash. The likely spread of the insurgency to neighbouring states or other parts of the country must be anticipated and contained. Above all, it will be an additional benefit to seek regional cooperation if only to stop the widely-known trans-border dimension of the insurgency. Without all these as part of a holistic, multi-pronged approach to solving the problem, the nation risks the emergence of a certain chaos just as bad as the one that led to the emergency rule.