Niger Delta: What amnesty?
By Said Adejumobi
THE Yar'Adua administration in closing the chapter of armed conflict and low intensity warfare in the Niger Delta between the Nigerian state and the militants of the region decided to offer political amnesty to all those who have been involved in the conflict, and promised them safe transition to a normal civil life. The regime also promised to rehabilitate the militants and offer them jobs, in return for their guns. The order was an executive proclamation in which Umaru Musa Yar'Adua exercised his constitutional powers of granting political amnesty. The amnesty runs in parallel with the controversial military operations of the Nigerian state in the region. A clear case of the carrot and the stick! But can it work?
Political amnesty is usually a product of two contexts - of either a negotiated settlement in which two warring parties have arrived at a dead-end in their conflict, and decide to settle their differences politically. Part of the political deal may be to offer amnesty for alleged crimes committed by the foot-soldiers of one or both parties to the conflict. Central to this kind of amnesty is negotiation and a peace deal. The second context is one of a victor's amnesty in which a party overwhelms the other, claims victory and decides to be magnanimous in victory by offering amnesty to some or all of the combatants on the defeated side.
There are historic examples of the two cases cited. South Africa offers the first example in which in the process of liquidating apartheid, there was a negotiated settlement. The Boers and the National Party, who have perpetrated heinous crimes against the majority black population were left off the hook, and allowed to continue enjoying the pleasures of a post-apartheid South Africa. It was called the birth of a 'non-racial' South Africa. An example of the second case is the aftermaths of the Nigerian civil war. After the federal side claimed victory, it decided to be generous in victory by offering amnesty to those who fought on the Biafran side-without persecution. Yakubu Gowon called it, "No victor, no vanquished". Of course, there was a victor and a vanquished. It was the political amnesty granted to the Biafran soldiers that made the difference!
What then do we make of the current amnesty by Yar'Adua in the Niger Delta given these contexts for amnesty provision? There is neither a negotiated settlement in the Niger Delta nor a victor's benevolence of any kind. There is no peace truce and the federal government has not won the military battle in the creeks in spite of its heavy artillery and weaponry. Why then offer an amnesty in a vacuum? There are possibly two explanations for this. Perhaps, the president and his advisers seek to provide incentive for the militants to shelve their guns and see reason, which may be a basis for future peace talks. But the president has not tabled any proposal of a dialogue or talk with the militants - he only offered unconditional amnesty.
The second possibility may be just for the regime to be seen to be doing something without any clear agenda of what it seeks to achieve and how it seeks to achieve it. At least granting amnesty is big media hype especially in the western world. The amnesty may then provide a diversion for the Nigerian state to complete its military operation and wipe out the militants completely from the region. Both explanations are not unproblematic.
The Yar'Adua offer is not the first time the Nigerian state is dangling the carrot to end the conflict in the delta region. Olusegun Obasanjo's recent past regime through some governors in the delta region offered a 'gun buy back' scheme in which the militants were expected to surrender their guns for handsome cash rewards. Of course they did, and used the money to buy new guns. So, the conflict not only continued, but intensified! Rather than solve the deep-seated problems beneath the conflict, easy soft solutions are being sought!
In order to make sense of the current complicated situation of armed violence, resistance and of course, banditry in the Delta region, we need to trace the genealogy of it. The Niger Delta struggle has undergone three major phases. The first phase was the period of a policy dialogue in which as part of the country's minority groups, the Niger delta sought better political accommodation in the nation's political system. This was a time in which several commissions were instituted to investigate the problem of the minorities and make policy recommendations. The period was the late colonial and immediate post independence eras. It never worked! But the beauty of it was that there was relative confidence in the political system and leadership of the country and the grievances were channeled through official quarters.
The second phase was when confidence in the system ebbed, and the struggle moved to the streets. This was the period of a non-violent peaceful struggle best symbolised by the efforts of Ken Saro Wiwa and MOSOP. The state infiltrated their rank and file, co-opted some, criminalised others, and eventually guillotined their core leadership. The consequence was that the nature and context of the struggle changed completely. The victims took on the tactics and strategy of the perpetrators and opted for armed rebellion as the solution to their grievances. This is the third phase in the Niger delta struggle.
The Niger Delta conflict could possibly have been resolved more easily and amicably about a decade and half ago, when there was clear leadership, organisation and structure of the resistance movement to deal with. That is not the case currently. The conflict in the delta has become a free fall in which all manner of actors have assumed the stage and it is now big business to be a Niger delta 'warrior'. Segments of the Nigerian ruling class are implicated in the Niger delta conflict and profiteering from it. The politicians are beneficiaries of the conflict in various ways. They use the armed groups for electoral purposes to intimidate opponents and 'win' elections, and also manipulate them for increase in resource allocation which they steal and cart away from the public treasury. Thus, many of the politicians especially from the ruling caucuses have strong links with the militant groups.
The serious democratic deficit in Nigeria's political system today suggests that the Nigerian ruling class still cherishes violence in realising political ends or goals. The recent re-run governorship election in Ekiti does not provide any incentive for the militants of the Niger Delta to sheath their swords. It was a case of the 'might is right' and those who hold the levers of power at the centre can afford to ignore and rubbish the aspirations of the people. Wherever the democratic voices of the people cannot be heard and prevail, armed resistance tends to be an attractive option especially for those who are already engaged in it.
The option of an unsolicited political amnesty at resolving the Niger Delta conflict is a cheap, soft sell solution. No wonder the major militant groups have simply either ignored or inveigh it. I see two solutions at resolving the Niger Delta question. The first is for the Nigerian state to shelve its vile high moral ground, and meaningfully and genuinely engage all actors in the delta region. This is not by creating a ministry of Niger Delta or appointing high profile people to positions in the delta region. It is through an inclusive dialogue with the Niger delta people (not only their governors and traditional rulers, but more importantly organised interests and social forces across the region including the militant groups). The Nigerian state should not speak for the delta region; the delta region should be allowed to speak for itself in terms of what it wants, and how it wants to co-exist in a peaceful and prosperous federation.
The second solution that I see is in making democracy work in Nigeria. If the votes and voices of the people do count, then perhaps many of those in power - at all levels - in the Niger Delta would not be there, offering the prospects of responsive, responsible and caring leadership which may ameliorate the pains and agony of the Niger Delta people.
- Dr. Adejumobi, an African Governance Expert lives in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.
